

# Whoami


#### Markus Gierlinger

Product Manager @ Cast AI

**former security researcher** @ Dynatrace

Enjoys exploring cybersecurity and AI

Magier in Markus



# Whois Molly?

- New and only **SecOps Engineer** at Wish Ltd.
  - Wish Ltd. has ~300 employees
  - Heavy use of Kubernetes
- Previously ~3 years experience as SRE
- Responsible for "securing" the product



# What does "secure" mean?


#### **Security & Compliance**























checkov















BLOOMBASE

**Bouncy Castle** 











































































SOPS









\*RAD

























SONOBUOY















RBAC LOOKUP







scribe





SignServer

















PRISMA CLOUD











rbac ma<u>na</u>er



Rudder











Slim<sup>toolkit</sup>



snyk



sonatype








STACKHAWK



### Defense in Depth



# Endless list of findings

expat	CVE-2019-15903	HIGH	2.2.6-r0		2.2.7-r	1 _ev	expat: heap-based buffer over-read via crafted XML input						
Схрас	CVL-2019-13903		2.2.0-10		2.2.,-1		https://avd.aquasec.com/nvd/cve-2019-15903						
libcrypto1.1	CVE-2019-1543		1.1.1a-r1		1.1.1b-	r1 op	oenssl:	ChaCha20—Poly1305 with lon	ng nonces				
<u> </u>			Falcosio	dekick UI					otal 93504 Critical 42	227 Debug 1842 Error	11244 Informational 17389	Notice 25623 Warn	ing 33179
libcrypto1.1	CVE-2020-1967	HIGH	DASHBOARD	DASHBOARD EVENTS INFO									
			Sources syscalls		▼ Prio	▼ Priorities		▼ Rules	*	Tags	¥	Since 2h	·
libcrypto1.1	CVE-2021-23840												
	0.5 0004 0.50		Search					Total 766 Critical 53 Debug 9 Error 140				58 <b>Notice</b> 275 W	arning 231
libcrypto1.1	CVE-2021-3450												
			Timestamp	Source	Priority	Rule		Output  Detect Polkit pkexec Local Privilege Escalation Exploit	h (01/5 0001 4004) ( (t	to the second of the second second of	and the second second	Tags	
libssl1.1	CVE-2019-1543		2022/05/11 12:18:18:565	syscalls	Critical	Polkit Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability (CVE-2021-4034)		args=%proc.args)  proc.args %proc.args proc.cmdline %proc.cmdline				process mitre_privilege_escalation	on
1/2-11 1	CVE-2020-1967		2022/05/11			Mount Launched in Privileged		Mount was executed inside a privileged container (use image=%container.image.repository:%container.image		%user.loginuid command=%proc.c	cmdline %container.info	container cis	
libssl1.1			12:18:12:561	syscalls	Warning	Container		container.image.repository %container.image.repository %proc.cmdline user.loginuid %user.loginuid user.		ner.image.tag container.info %	container.info proc.cmdline	mitre_lateral_movement	
			2022/05/11	greealle	Warning	Create Symlink Over	er Sensitive	Symlinks created over sensitive files (user=%user.nam linkpath=%evt.arg.linkpath parent_process=%proc.pna	ame)			file mitre_exfiltration	
libssl1.1	CVE-2021-23840	E-2021-23840 HIGH 12:17:58:555		systalis	Warning Files			extrag inhipsth % extra (lisipath extrag target % extrag target proc.cmdine %proc.cmdine proc.pmane %proc.pmane %p				me_eximuation	
libssl1.1	CVE-2021-3450		2022/05/11 12:17:40:538	syscalls	Notice	Launch Ingress Remote File Copy Tools in Container	Ingress remote file copy tool launched in container (us container_id=%container.id container_name=%container.id container.image.repositor;	ner.name image=%container.im	age.repository:%container.image.	tag)	network process		
(1033(1.1								%container.name k8s.ns.name %k8s.ns.name k8 user.loginuid %user.loginuid user.name %user.name	x8s.pod.name %k8s.pod.name			mitre_command_and_co	ontrol
			2022/05/11 12:17:38:536	syscalls			nteractive	System user ran an interactive command (user=%user image=%container.image.repository)		ginuid command=%proc.cmdline o	container_id=%container.id		
sqlite-libs	CVE-2019-19244				Informational	System user interacti		container.id %container.id container.image.repositor user.name %user.name	*container.image.repository	proc.cmdline %proc.cmdline	user.loginuid %user.loginuid	users mitre_remote	_access_tools
			2022/05/11 12:17:29:528	syscalls			n spawned process	Database-related program spawned process other tha container_id="%container.id image="%container.image.id"	repository)			process database	)
					Notice	DB program spawne		container.id %container.id container.image.repositor user.loginuid %user.loginuid user.name %user.nar		ge-repository proc.cmdline %proc.cmdline proc.pname %proc.pname			mitre_execution
			2022/05/11	gyscalle	Error	Write below rpm dat		Rpm database opened for writing by a non-rpm progra container_id="\$container.id image="\$container.image.t	repository)			filesystem software	e_mgmt
			12:17:29:527	syscalis	Ellor	write below rpm da	itabase	container.id %container.id container.image.repositor				mitre_persistence	
			2022/05/11	syscalls	Warning	Modify Shell Config	guration File	a shell configuration file has been modified (user=%us file=%fd.name container_id=%container.id image=%co container.id %container.id container.image.repositor;	ontainer.image.repository)			file mitre_persisten	ce)
			12:17:25:526			,		%proc.pcmdline user.loginuid %user.loginuid use a shell configuration file was read by a non-shell progr	ser.name %user.name				
			2022/05/11 12:17:09:520	syscalls	Warning	Read Shell Configur	ration File	a shell configuration file was read by a non-shell progr container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repositor; container.id %container.id container.image.repositor;	repository)			file mitre_discovery	
		12.17.09.320					%user.loginuid user.name %user.name Unexpected UDP Traffic Seen (user=%user.name user,						
			2022/05/11 12:17:08:519	syscalls	Notice	Unexpected UDP Tra	UDP Traffic	evt=%evt.type %evt.args container_id=%container.id in container.id %container.id container.image.repositor	mage=%container.image.reposit	tory)		network mitre_exfut	tration
								%fd name proceeding %proceeding user look	insid Yuser Inginuid user pan	Nurser name			




# Does this make our environments secure?

# "Defenders think in lists. Attackers think in graphs. As long as this is true, attackers win"

John Lambert, VP Security @ Microsoft, 2015




# Threat Intelligence




Sysdig: Scarleteel 2.0

Wiz' Cloud Threat Landscape



#### MITRE ATT&CK




MITRE ATT&CK - Containers Matrix

# Attack Graph

= combination of TTPs

#### Resource-centric




#### Attack-centric



# Attack Path Analysis

- Models all possible attack paths
- Full visiblity of environment
- Contextualizes findings
- Enables advanced analysis




# Attack Path Analysis Tools

#### IceKube



- 25 TTPs
- uses Neo4J
- Query using Cypher




#### KubeHound



- 25 TTPs
- uses JanusGraph
- Jupyter Notebook for analysis
- experimental automation features

# Getting real

#### Attack Path Analysis




# Adversary Emulation



# Adversary Emulation

- Perform attack on real environments
- Evalates the effectiveness of security controls
- Varying degree of realism:



## **Atomic Emulation**

- detonate single TTPs
- primarily use-case:
  - test processing pipeline
  - manage detections

#### Tools

#### **Atomic Red Team**



- 1700+ TTPs
- focus on OS-based TTPs
- ~10 TTPs for Docker + K8s


#### Stratus Red Team



- **5**0+
- focuses on AWS, Azure, GCP
- ~8 TTPs for K8s

#### Planned Emulation

- aka "Micro emulations"
- easy to automate
- Validate atomic + chain analytics
- good for reproducing scenarios



#### Planned Emulation: Tools

#### Mitre Caldera



- oldest and most mature emulation tool (2015)
- primary for enterprise environments
- no special K8s support
- big plugin ecosystem
- supports automated planning

#### Leonidas

- similar to Stratus Red Team
- allows chaining of TTPs
- runs as workload inside K8s cluster
- supports only kubectl -based TTPs for K8s

### Realistic Emulation

- "Fog of War"
- a red team engagement



#### **Use Cases**

- Evaluate incident response plans
- testing more sophisticated defenses
  - Moving Target Defense
  - Deception



#### Tools





Ran

# Demo

## Take-aways

Adopt an attacker's mindset to assess your effective security.

#### **Attack Path Analysis**

- Contextualize security findings
- Uncover dangerous combinations
- Plan for improvements



#### **Adversary Emulation**

- Validate security controls
- Improve detection & response
- Show value of more advanced defenses

